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**EX PARTE** 

Warren D. Hannah Director – Federal Regulatory Relations Local Telecommunications Division

September 26, 1996

Mr. William F. Caton Acting Secretary Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street, N.W. Room 222 Washington, D.C. 20554 RECEIVED

SEP 2 6 1996

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

OFFICE OF SECRETARY

RE:

In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service -

CC Docket No. 96-45

Dear Mr. Caton:

On September 25, 1996, representatives of Sprint Corporation met with Ms. Anna Gomez, of the Commission's Universal Service Branch and with Mr. Anthony Bush of the Commission's Office of General Counsel. Representing Sprint Corporation were Messrs. Jim Sichter, Larry Millard, Jay Keithley and the undersigned.

Sprint's proposals, filed on April 12, 1996, in the above referenced proceeding were discussed during the meeting. The attached information was used during the meeting. This ex parte notice is filed today since the meeting concluded during the afternoon of September 25.

It is requested that this information be made a part of the record in this matter. Two copies of this letter, in accordance with Section 1.1206(a)(1) of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, are provided for this purpose.

Please call on the above telephone number if there are any questions.

Sincerely,

Warren D. Hannah


#### Attachment

c: Ms. Anna Gomez, FCC, Washington, D.C. Mr. Anthony Bush, FCC, Washington, D.C.

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# UNIVERSAL SERVICE SPRINT'S PLAN FOR SUPPORT

September 25, 1996



# ACCESS REFORM AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE

- Unsustainability of internal (Implicit) Subsi
- Impact of Access Reform



#### UNSUSTAINABILITY OF INTERNAL (IMPLICIT) SUBSIDIES

Maintaining Universal Service Support through internal "cross subsidies" is Inconsistent with the Telecom Act, and is Incompatible with, and Unsustainable in, a Competitive Market Place

- Problems with Embedding "Subsidies" in LEC Prices
  - Neither explicit nor targeted
  - Artificially low rates (for the subsidized services) are a barrier to competitive entry
  - Artificially high rates (for the services providing the subsidy)...
    - Provide incorrect price signals to potential entrants
    - Are unsustainable



#### Unsustainability of Current Ix Access Rates in a Competitive Environment

- The Telecom Act of 1996 requires incumbent LECs to provide unbundled Network Elements to competitive LECS at cost-based rates
  - Creating an arbitrage opportunity to the extent that the total revenues (Local and Access) generated by an element under the existing rate structures exceed the costs for that unbundled element
  - And, ultimately, undermining the cross-subsidies embedded in existing rate structures
- New Entrants can undermine Access Rates
  - If rate level too high (above economic costs)
  - If rate structures inefficient
    - e.g., per MOU recovery of fixed or NTS costs

## Carrier Common Line Revenues Disaggregated by Customer Usage

Usage Segment MOU/Month	Access % of Lines Total		CCL Revenue (Inter & Intra)	% of Total	CCL Revenue per Line
<u> </u>	LAILS	.IVIII	(max comula)	.13444	<u> </u>
Residental					
0	70,447	2.5% \$	-	0.0%	\$ -
0-100	767,815	27.2% \$	673,485	3.1%	\$ 0.88
100-200	442,665	15.7% \$	1,326,621	6.2%	\$ 3.00
200-300	324,892	11.5% \$	1,591,209	7.4%	\$ 4.90
300-1000	939,235	33.3% \$	9,753,185	45.5%	\$ 10.38
1000-2000	226,949	8.0% \$	5,399,230	25.2%	\$ 23.79
2000-5000	50,405	1.8% \$	2,335,103	10.9%	\$ 46.33
5000+	2,358	0.1% \$	348,841	1.6%	<b>\$</b> 147.94
TOTAL	2,824,766	100.0% \$	21,427,675	100.0%	<b>5</b> 7.59
			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		
Business				•	
0	193,955	14.3% \$	•	0.0%	<b>.</b>
0-100	567,692	42.0% \$	363,886	3.5%	
100-200	152,528	11.3% \$	477,805	4.5%	
200-300	94,035	7.0% \$	493,989	4.7%	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
300-1000	235,348	17.4% \$	2,710,393	25.8%	11.52
1000-2000	67,702	5.0% \$	1,938,895	18.4%	28.64
2000-5000	31,536	2.3% \$	1,993,250	19.0%	63.21
5000+	9,617	0.7% \$	2,534,321	24.1%	263.53
TOTAL Based on November 199	1,352,413	100.0% \$	10,512,539	100.0%	7.77

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CT&T Centel of North Carolina Ohio, United & Centel Texas, Illinois and Missouri



## Local Switching "Subsidy"\* Disaggregated by Cusomer Usage

Usage Segment MOU/Month	Access Lines	% of Total		Local Switching (Inter & Intra)	% of Total		Local Switching per Line	
Residental								
. 0	70,447	2.5%	\$		0.0%	\$	-	
0-100	767,815	27.2%	\$	316,420	2.9%	\$	0.41	
100-200	442,665	15.7%	\$	642,250	5.9%	\$	1.45	
200-300	324,892	11.5%	\$	782,421	7.1%	\$	2.41	
300-1000	939,235	33.3%	\$	4,947,455	45.1%	\$	5.27	
1000-2000	226,949	8.0%	\$	2,839,538	25.9%	\$	12.51	
2000-5000	50,405	1.8%	\$	1,268,355	11.6%	\$	25.16	
5000+	2,358	0.1%	\$	182,012	1.7%	\$	77.19	
TOTAL	2,824,766	100.0%	\$	10,978,451	100.0%	\$	3.89	
Business		• .	,	<del>.</del>	4			
0	193,955	14.3%	\$		0.0%	\$		
0-100	567,692	42.0%	\$	164,100	3.4%	\$	0.29	
100-200	152,528	11.3%	\$	222,116	4.6%	\$	1.46	
200-300	94,035	7.0%	\$	232,429	4.8%	\$	2.47	
300-1000	235,348	17.4%	\$	1,292,699	26.9%	\$	5.49	
1000-2000	67,702	5.0%	\$	919,511	19.1%	\$	13.58	
2000-5000	31,536	2.3%	\$	898,966	18.7%	\$	28.51	
5000+	9,617	<u>0.7</u> %	\$	1,075,655	<u>22.4%</u>	\$_	111.85	
TOTAL	1,352,413	100.0%	\$	4,805,476	100.0%	\$	3.55	

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CTYT Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas Illinois and Missouri



<sup>\*</sup>Difference between current access rates and local termination proxy of \$.02/Mou

## Interconnection Charge (RIC) Disaggregated by Customer Usage

Usage Segment MOU/Month	Access Lines	% of Total	RIC (Inter & Intra)	% of Total	RIC per Line	
•	·					
Residental						
0	70,447	2.5%	-	0.0% \$		
0-100	767,815	27.2%	•	2.6% \$	0.24	
100-200	442,665	15.7%		5.5% \$	0.88	
200-300	324,892	11.5%	488,814.88	6.9% \$	1.50	
300-1000	939,235	33.3%	•	45.2% \$	3.40	
1000-2000	226,949	8.0%	1,866,694.63	26.4% \$	8.23	
2000-5000	50,405	1.8%	828,011.64	11.7% \$	16.43	
5000+	2,358	0.1%	114,554.23	1.6% \$	48.58	
TOTAL	2,824,766	100%	7,069,227	100.0% \$	2.50	
Business						
0	193,955	14.3%		0.0% \$	•	
0-100	567,692	42.0%	94,732	3.2% \$	0.17	
100-200	152,528	11.3%	•	4.5% \$	0.86	
200-300	94,035	7.0%		4.7% \$	1.48	
300-1000	235,348	17.4%		26.7% \$	3.34	
1000-2000	67,702	5.0% \$	•	19.2% \$	8.35	
2000-5000	31,536	2.3% \$		19.0% \$	17.77	
5000+	9,617	0.7% \$		22.7% \$	69.43	
TOTAL	1,352,413	100.0% \$		100.0% \$	2.18	

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CT&T Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas, Illinois and Missouri



#### Total Access Subsidy Disaggregated

Usage	Access	% of	,	Access Subsidy	% of		Access Subsidy
Segment	Lines	Total	•	(Inter & Intra)	Total		per Line
Residental							
0	70,447	2.5%	<b>\$</b> ·	. •	0.0%	\$	•
0-100	767,815	27.2%	\$	1,175,135	3.0%	\$	1.53
100-200	442,665	15.7%	\$	2,360,336	6.0%	\$	5.33
200-300	324,892	11.5%	\$	2,862,445	7.3%	\$	8.81
300-1000	939,235	33.3%	\$	17,895,097	45.3%	\$	19.05
1000-2000	226,949	8.0%	\$	10,105,463	25.6%	\$	44.53
2000-5000	50,405	1.8%	\$	4,431,469	11.2%	\$	87.92
5000+	2,358	0.1%	\$	645,408	1.6%	\$	273.71
TOTAL	2,824,766	100.0%	\$	39,475,354	100.0%		13.97
Business	e in the second						
0	193,955	14.3%	s	• ·	0.0%	\$	
0-100	567,692	42.0%	\$	622,717	3.4%	-	1.10
100-200	152,528	11.3%	\$	830,993	4.6%	\$	5.45
200-300	94,035	7.0%	<b>3</b> ′	865,571	4.7%	\$	9.20
300-1000	235,348	17.4%	Š	4,790,106	26.2%	\$	20.35
1000-2000	67,702	5.0%	\$	3,423,659	18.7%	\$	50.57
2000-5000	31,536	2.3%	\$	3,452,473	18.9%	\$	109.48
5000+	9,617	0.7%	\$	4,277,683	23.4%	\$_	444.80
TOTAL	1,352,413	100.0%	\$	18,263,202	100.0%	\$	13.50

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CT&T Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas, Illinois and Missouri



### Sustainability Example: Carrier Common Line Charge

## Recovery of NTS Loop Costs through per MOU Charge

- Results in high users contributing well in excess of the costs of their loops
- Providing incentive for IXCs (or CLECs) to "cap" the access costs of serving these customers by serving them through either non-ILEC facilities or resold ILEC loops

	CCLC Revenue	CCLC Revenue Unbundled	
	Generated by Customer	Loop Cost	Net Revenue gain to CLEC
Residential	\$46.33	\$20.00	\$26.33
Customer		<b>.</b> *	
Business Customer	\$63.21	\$15.00	\$48.21




## Comparison between IX Access and Local Interconnection Pricing

	Loop	Local Switching	Transport	Transport RIC
IX Access (Industry Average)	\$.00834/MOU	\$.00991/MOU	\$.00250/MOU	\$.00674/MOU
Local Interconnect  •(Transport and termination)	ction Not included	TE-LRIC* (.2c4c/MOU	TE-LRIC* J)	Not included

\*Per FCC 96-98 Order

# Revenue Impact of Pricing IX Access at Local Interconnection Levels (Industry Totals Interstate Only)



Interconnection Levels

#### SPRINT UNIVERSAL SERVICE PLAN

- Principles
- Services Eligible for Subsidies
- Determination of Subsidy
- Costing Standard
- Eligibility Criteria for Receiving the Subsidy
- Implementation
- Funding
- Administration of Funds



#### Sprint Plan

Sprint Universal Service Plan -- Principles

- Competitive Neutrality
  - Should Not Impair Competition
    - All carriers should contribute to USF on an equitable basis
  - Subsidy Funding Should be Portable
    - Available to all qualified providers of local service
- Specific (Targeted)
- Predictable
- Eliminate Current Internal (Implicit) Subsidy Flows, as well as replace Existing Explicit Subsidy Funding

## SPRINT PLAN SERVICES ELIGIBLE FOR SUBSIDIES

- Residential Services Only
- Initial Service Definition
  - Local Dial Tone and Ability to Make Local Calls
  - Access to Chosen Long Distance Carrier
  - Access to Emergency Services
  - Single Party Service
  - Touch Tone
  - Annual Local Directory
  - Directory Assistance

## SPRINT PLAN DETERMINATION OF SUBSIDY

- Income Related Subsidies
  - Lifeline, Linkup, and Other Explicit Subsidy
     Mechanisms to Support Low Income
     Subscribers Would Continue
- High Cost Area Subsidies
  - Available to Subsidize Basic Residential
     Service in Areas Where the Costs of
     Providing Service Exceed National and State
     Standard for "Affordable" Rate



## SPRINT PLAN COSTING STANDARD FOR DETERMINING HIGH COST AREAS

- The Benchmark Cost Model Should be the Basis for Measuring the Costs of Providing Services for USF Purposes.
  - The BCM is a Reasonable Proxy for the Economic Costs of Serving a Particular Area
- Advantages of the BCM
  - Based on Objective, Verifiable, Public Data and Accepted Network Engineering Standards
    - Cost Results not Distorted by Historic Accounting and Depreciation Policies
    - Does Not Require Arbitrary Allocations or Dissagregations of Existing Investment to Smaller Geographic Units
    - Avoids Controversy Over Whether Embedded Costs Representation.
       "Efficient" or "Inefficient" Management



## SPRINT PLAN COSTING STANDARD FOR DETERMINING HAGE COST AREAS

#### Advantages of the BCM (continued)

- Competitively Neutral
  - Subsidy funding (per subscriber) will be the Same for all Services
     Providers
  - The BCM is a Proxy for the Costs that <u>Any Efficient Provider</u> would Incur in Providing Service to a Particular Area
    - ° Subsidy Amount Not biased by an Incumbent's Embedded Costs
    - ° Provides Incentive for Competitive Entry into High Cost Are:
    - Provides Incentive for Efficiency
    - Provides Incentive for Innovation



## SPRINT PLAN COSTING STANDARD FOR DETERMINING HIGH COST AREAS

#### Advantages of the BCM (continued)

- Disaggregation of Costs By Census Block Group (CBG)
  - More Precisely Identifies Truly High Cost Areas
  - Avoids Competitive distortions Inherent in Using Higher Levels of Aggregation (e.g. exchange or study area) for USF Purposes
    - Basing Subsidies on Averaged Costs will not Provide New Entrants Sufficient Incentives to Serve Those Areas Where Costs Exceed the Average (potentially leading to "creamskimming")



# SPRINT PLAN DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNTS OF SUBSIDY

- The Amount of Subsidy Provided for a CBG Would be the Difference Between
  - The National Benchmark Price for Basic Residential Service (i.e., the maximum rate determined to be "reasonable" and "affordable"), and the
  - BCM-Calculated Cost For that CBG
- The National Benchmark Price Should be Set at Least at the National Average Rate for Basic Residential Service in <u>Urban</u> areas, Including the Existing Subscriber Line Charge.
- State USF Plans Could Use the Same Methodology to the Extent State Repricing Does Not Resolve All State-Specific Subsidies



## SPRINT PLAN DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF SUBSIDY: EXAMPLE

#### Assume:

#### Federal Subsidy (per Access Line)

1.	BCM Cost	\$30
2.	FCC Benchmark Price	\$20
3.	Federal Subsidy (L1-L2)	\$10

State Subsidy (Per Access Line

4.	State	B	en	chm	ark P	rice	\$15

5. State Subsidy (L2-L4) \$5



## SPRINT PLAN USF FUND SIZE AT ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL BENCHMARK PRICE LEVELS

Summary Model Results
National Total
(\$) (Billions)

Annual

**Benchmark Cost** 

\$59,252

Aggregate Support

at \$20 \$14,666

at 30 \$7,425

at 40 \$4,259

Average

Monthly Cost \$29.98



# SPRINT PLAN ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR RECEIVING THE FUNDING

- USF Funding Will be Available to Both Incumbent LECs and New Entrants
- To Qualify for USF Funding, an ETC (Eligible Telecommunications Carrier) Must:
  - Be Willing to Serve the Entire Service Area
  - Offer All of the Services that are Supported by the Fund
  - Use Their Own Facilities or a Combination of Owned Facilities and Resale of Another Carrier's Facilities
- An ETC Will Receive Support Only Where It Provides Service Either Over Its Own Facilities or Over Resold Facilities For Which It Pays Cost-Based Rates
- USF Support Should be Portable (When Subscribers Change Their Local Service Provider, the Subsidy Payment Should Then Go to the New Service Provider)

## Sprint Plan Implementation

- Implementation Steps
  - Each Incumbent LEC Would Quantify its Net Change in USF Support (i.e., USF Support Under the New Plan Less USF Support it Received Under the Existing Plan)
  - The Incremental USF Funding Would Flow Through, Dollar for Dollar, in Reductions in Embedded Subsidies; e.g.,
    - CCLC
    - Transport RIC